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Between 1958 and 1961, China experienced one of its worst famines in
history. Birth rates plummeted during these years, but recovered imme-
diately afterwards. The famine-born cohorts were relatively scarce in the
marriage and labor markets. The famine also adversely a⁄ected the health
of these cohorts. This paper decomposes these two e⁄ects on the marital
outcomes of the famine-born and adjacent cohorts in the rural areas of two
hard hit provinces, Sichuan and Anhui. Individuals born pre and post-
famine, who were in surplus relative to their customary spouses, were able
to marry. Using the Choo Siow model of marriage matching, the paper
shows that the famine substantially reduced the marital attractiveness of
the famine born cohort. The modest decline in educational attainment
of the famine born cohort does not explain the change in spousal quality
of that cohort. Thus, the famine-born cohort, who were relatively scarce
compared with their customary spouses, did not have signi￿cant above
average marriage rates.
￿We thank SSHRC for ￿nancial support.
11 Introduction
The ￿Great Leap Forward￿was a national-level political and economic exper-
iment carried out in China between 1958-1961.1 Collectivization of farming,
which began in the mid-￿fties, increased in speed and scope. Rural labor was
reallocated from agriculture towards industry: People were moved from vil-
lages to work in urban factories, while agricultural land and labor were directed
towards steel production in ￿backyard furnaces￿ . In many localities, strong po-
litical incentives contributed to o¢ cial exaggeration of grain yields, which led
to a reduction in sown area, and excessive state procurement and export based
on these exaggerated reports. This was in addition to a state rationing system
that already favored urban industrial workers to the detriment of the villages.
The Greap Leap Forward resulted in the most severe famine in China in the
20th century. Estimates of famine-related mortality range from 15 to 30 million
deaths. Peng (1987) estimates that births lost or postponed resulted in about 25
million fewer births.2 In general, the countryside was struck much harder than
cities.3 The economic experiment was abandoned by early 1962. The mortality
rate quickly fell and the birth rate also quickly recovered.
While the drop in birth rates is widely recognized, much less is known about
the e⁄ects on those who were born during the famine. The medical literature
reports that there are severe deleterious long-run health e⁄ects for individuals
su⁄ering nutritional deprivation either in utero or in their infancy (See Barker,
1992). Recent research by Gorgens et. al. (2005), St. Clair et. al. (2005),
and Luo, Mu and Zhang (2006) provide some direct con￿rmation for this in the
case of China, focusing on such health-related outcomes as stunting, obesity,
and schizophrenia.
Not all the e⁄ects of the famine on the famine-born cohorts were negative.
Due to the drop in the birth rates, the famine-born cohorts were small relative
to adjacent birth cohorts. This scarcity should increase their relative values in
both the marriage and labor market. Their increased value in the labor market
should also further add to their desirability in the marriage market.
The net e⁄ect of the famine on marital outcomes of famine-born cohorts is an
aggregation of three e⁄ects: (1) a negative attractiveness e⁄ect due to adverse
health outcomes that reduces demand for famine-born spouses; (2) a positive
attractiveness (wage) e⁄ect due to relative scarcity of famine-born cohorts in the
labor market that increases their demand as spouses; and (3) due to customary
gender di⁄erences in ages of marriage, there is an increase in spousal demand for
famine-born cohorts because of their relative scarcity in the marriage market.
1For an overview of the Great Leap Forward, see Lardy (1987).
2Ashton et. al. (1984) provide estimates at the national level of the magnitude of the
demographic crisis. See Peng (1987) for a detailed analysis of the impact of the famine at the
provincial level. Lin and Yang (2000) and Li and Yang (2006) examine causes of the famine.
Becker (1997) provides a narrative account.
3The famine also extended beyond China￿ s traditional famine belt region. For example,
Sichuan province, in which mass famines were historically rare, was one of the hardest struck.
2The objective of this paper is to study the e⁄ect of the famine on the marital
outcomes of the famine-born and adjacent cohorts. We will decompose the
observed changes in marital outcomes into those due to changes in relative
scarcity versus those due to changes in attractiveness.
The change in marital attractiveness due to the famine is di¢ cult to mea-
sure. In the censuses that we use, there are no wage measures that might capture
attractiveness. Instead, we will use educational attainment as a proxy for at-
tractiveness, but such proxies provide a noisy measure of the actual change in
marital attractiveness.4 To get around these di¢ culties, we will use a residual
accounting approach to measure the unobserved changes in attractiveness where
the di⁄erences in marital outcomes, after accounting for quantity changes, are
attributed to changes in attractiveness.5 To do so, we need a model of the mar-
riage market that will provide an estimate of what a change in quantity, ceteris
paribus, will do.6 Our empirical model will be the CS marriage matching func-
tion (Choo and Siow 2006).7 The main bene￿t of the CS marriage matching
function is that it has substitution e⁄ects, a central focus of this paper.8
Sichuan and Anhui, two primarily agricultural provinces located in western
and eastern China, respectively, were two of the most severely a⁄ected provinces
by the famine.9 Because the famine disproportionately a⁄ected rural rather than
urban communities,10 we will focus our analysis on the rural population in both
provinces. Thus, all ￿gures and statistics in this paper pertain to the rural
population.
Figures 1 and 1a show the distributions of individuals by age in the 1990
Census for Sichuan and Anhui, respectively. Due to a high long-run birth rate
and mortality rates that increase with age, population by age should be declining
with age. As we can see in Figure 1 for Sichuan, there is a sharp drop in the
population of the famine-born cohort, 29-31 year old men and women, or those
4Unobserved marital attractiveness is a standard concern. Akabayashi (2006) and Lee
(2005), for example, show that individuals born in deterministic ￿unlucky￿ years in Japan
and Korea respectively, have worse marriage market outcomes. These worse outcomes occur
in spite of their relative scarcity in the marriage market as parents try to avoid those unlucky
birth years.
5Residual accounting methods are common in economics. See, for example, Oxaca decom-
positions in labor economics and Solow residuals in growth accounting.
6Oxaca decompositions in labor economics use earnings regressions and Solow residuals in
growth accounting use the Solow growth model.
7A marriage matching function is a production function for marriages (Pollard 1997, Pollack
1990). Inputs are population vectors of types of individuals. Output is a matrix of who marries
whom, and who remains unmarried.
8The workhorse marriage matching function of demography, the harmonic mean marriage
matching function, e.g. Schoen(1981), does not have substitution e⁄ects.
9In 1957, 86 and 92 percent of the labor force were in the primary (agriculture, ￿sheries and
forestry) sector in Sichuan and Anhui, respectively. Between 65-70 percent of GDP originated
in the primary sector. These data are taken from Xin Zhongguo wushi nian tongji ziliao
huibian, 2005). Further details are in Peng (1987).
10Peng(1987) documents that excess mortality was more severe in rural than in urban areas.
At the national level, the excess crude death rate for the urban population between 1958-1962
was 13.84 compared to 7.94 for the two preceding years. By comparison, the excess crude
death rate for the rural population rose from 11.45 to 24.45 over the same period. See Peng
(1987), p. 646.
3born between 1959-1961. The panel also shows the quick recovery in fertility
after the famine. Figure 1a plots population by age for Anhui, which was also
heavily a⁄ected by the famine. Again, there is a sharp drop in the size of the
famine-born cohort as well as a quick recovery in fertility after the famine.
Our empirical strategy is to compare the marital behavior of the famine-
a⁄ected cohorts in 1990 to their same age counterparts in 1982. The famine-
born cohort were between ages 29 to 31 in 1990. We consider the pre and post
famine-born cohorts to be those between ages 32-34 and ages 26-28 in 1990,
respectively. Thus we will compare the marital behavior of individuals between
the ages of 26 to 34 in 1990 to their same age counterparts in 1982.
What Figures 1 and 1a cannot show are the quality e⁄ects of the famine
on the famine-born cohort. Using national samples, Almond et. al.(2007) show
that educational attainment fell for the famine-born cohort. In this paper, we
will investigate the changes in educational attainment for the famine-a⁄ected
cohorts as a proxy for the changes in marital attractiveness of those cohorts.
We will also investigate the e⁄ects of the changes in educational attainment on
changes in marital behavior.
Our results show that famine-a⁄ected women in 1990 had approximately the
same long-run marriage rates as their same age non-famine-a⁄ected peers did
in 1982. Pre famine-born men in 1990 had approximately the same marriage
rates as their same age 1982 peers. Famine-born and post famine-born men
had higher marriage rates than their same age 1982 peers. Taken as a whole,
famine-a⁄ected individuals had weakly higher marriage rates than their non-
famine a⁄ected peers. Given the large changes in customary sex ratios for the
famine-a⁄ected cohorts, these individuals had to show substantial ￿ exibility in
their choices of spouses. For many of these individuals, marrying, albeit to a
non-customary spouse, is substantially preferred to remaining unmarried.
We ￿rst consider a CS marriage matching function (MMF) where individuals
are di⁄erentiated by gender and age. We estimate this model using the 1982
census for both provinces. Using these estimates, we predict what the marriage
rates would have been in 1990 given the changes in population supplies a⁄ected
by the famine. The predicted marriage rates are marginally higher than the ac-
tual marriage rates for famine-born women and marginally lower for pre-famine
born women. The predicted marriage rates are signi￿cantly higher than the ac-
tual marriage rates for famine-born men and signi￿cantly lower for pre-famine
born men. The large discrepancies between predicted and actual marriage rates
of the famine-a⁄ected individuals imply that there was substantial decline in
the marital attractiveness of the famine-born cohorts relative to their pre and
post famine-born cohorts.
A natural question that arises is the extent to which the decline in mari-
tal attractiveness of the famine-born cohort can be captured by di⁄erences in
educational attainment of the various cohorts. To answer this question, we
re-estimate the CS model, allowing now for matching by both age and educa-
tional attainment. We show that the changes in educational attainment for the
famine-born cohort are insu¢ cient to explain changes in marital behavior of that
cohort. Alternatively, the change in marital attractiveness of the famine-born
4cohort is not well captured by the changes in their educational attainment.
Our paper is related to two literatures. First, it is related to the literature
that studies the e⁄ects of the ￿Great Leap Forward￿on social and economic
outcomes (E.g. Almond, et. al. 2007; Chen 2007; Geogens, et. al. 2004; Porter
2007). Of these papers, Almond et. al. and Porter study the e⁄ects on the
marriage market. We build on their work.
In addition to other outcomes, both of these two papers use a regression
framework to study the causal e⁄ects of the famine on marital behavior of the
a⁄ected cohorts. These include marriage rates, age at marriage, spousal age
di⁄erences and other spousal characteristics. They concluded that the famine
had modest e⁄ects on marriage rates, caused the a⁄ected cohorts to marry
later, increased their spousal age gaps, and decreased their spousal education
gaps. However, the two papers attribute the outcomes to di⁄erent causal mech-
anisms. Almond et. al. emphasize the decline in marital attractiveness of the
famine-born cohort whereas Porter emphasizes the relative scarcity of famine-
born cohort in the marriage market. Almond et. al. use variations in provincial
mortality rates of the famine-a⁄ected cohorts as a regressor and interpret its
estimated e⁄ect as due to changes in marital attractiveness. Porter uses marital
share weighted adult sex ratios of the famine-a⁄ected cohorts within and across
provinces as a regressor and interprets its estimated e⁄ect as due to changes in
sex ratios. Since the famine increased mortality and decreased birth rates (and
therefore eventual population supplies to the marriage market), it is di¢ cult
to disentangle empirically the two e⁄ects in a regression framework. To relax
the ￿either or￿hypothesis, we use a structural model of marriage matching to
decompose observed marital behavior to both of these mechanisms.
A famine e⁄ect on marital behavior is a general equilibrium e⁄ect. For exam-
ple, the sum of all men of a particular type that di⁄erent types of women marry
must be less than or equal to the number of men of that type. A regression using
individual level data of spousal characteristics on individual attributes ignores
these general equilibrium constraints.11 General equilibrium e⁄ects are poten-
tially signi￿cant due to the large imbalances in customary sex ratios caused by
the famine. These e⁄ects apply to both causal mechanisms discussed above. By
construction, the CS model imposes all relevant general equilibrium constraints.
In general, our empirical results agree qualitatively with those found by Al-
mond et. al. and Porter.12 We also show that both relative scarcity and changes
in marital attractiveness matter, and there are ￿rst-order general equilibrium
e⁄ects. Ignoring these general equilibrium e⁄ects lead to inadmissible predicted
marital behavior such as predicted marriage rates that are above one.
A caveat is in order. While there are de￿ciencies to the regression approach
to study the e⁄ects of the famine on marital behavior, our approach is based on
the untestable assumption that the CS model is the appropriate model of the
11The inability of the regression framework using individual level data to deal with general
equilibrium e⁄ects are well known (E.g. Imbens and Woolridge 2008; Heckman, Lochner and
Taber 1999). In the marriage context, see Choo and Siow.
12Finer comparisons are misleading because of the di⁄erences in samples and methodologies.
We use rural Sichuan and Anhui samples and they use national samples.
5marriage market. Such an assumption is standard to most residual accounting
methods. Thus we view our paper as complimentary to the above two papers.
Our paper is also related to the literature which studies the e⁄ect of ex-
ogenous variations in the sex ratios on marital outcomes (Akabayashi, 2006;
Bhrolchain 2001; Brainard 2006; Esteve i and CabrØ 2004; Francis 2007). Many
of the exogenous variations in sex ratios have both a quality and quantity di-
mension due to the e⁄ects of war (E.g. Brainard; Esteve i and CabrØ; and
Francis). Even the variations in sex ratios due to superstition about being born
in ￿unlucky￿years have a quality dimension (Akabayashi). Individuals born in
these ￿unlucky￿years su⁄er a social stigma which makes them less desirable in
the marriage market. But they bene￿t from being relatively scarce in the labor
and marriage market. Our framework can be applied to disentangle these two
e⁄ects in these environments.
Methodology
In this paper, we will use three statistics to study marital behavior: marriage
rates (which measure the gains to marrying versus not marrying), marriage
shares (which measure who marries whom) and a marital accounting scheme,
total gains to marriage (which combine the ￿rst two concerns).
Let t denote the year of the census, t = f1982;1990). At each year, indi-
viduals are di⁄erentiated by their age and or education. Let j denote type j
women and i denote type i men. j = 1;::;J and i = 1;::I. nt
j is the number of
women of type j in year t. nt
i is the number of men of type i in year t. ￿t
j is the
number of married women of type j year t. ￿t
i is the number of married men of
type i year t. Let ￿t
ij be the number of type i men married to type j women.
There are I ￿ J types of marriages at time t.
The sex ratio between type i men and type j women, St







; i = 1;::;I; j = 1;::J (1)
In general, we expect adult sex ratios to be close to one.







; g = i;j; i = 1;::;I; j = 1;::J (2)













; g = i;j; i = 1;::;I; j = 1;::J (3)
The marriage rates or odds ratios are informative about the choice of whether
to marry or not. They are equivalent univariate measures of marital behavior.
The marriage rates or odds ratios are not informative about substitution pat-
terns in marriage, i.e. who marries whom.















; i = 1;::;I; j = 1;::J (5)
st
ijj is the share of type j spouses among type i￿ s wives. st
jji is the share of
type i spouses among type j￿ s husbands. Shares are informative about spousal
subsitution patterns, i.e. who to marry. By de￿nition, the sum of the shares
across di⁄erent types of spouses for the same type of individual is one. Thus
the shares are not informative about the choice of whether to marry or not. Nor
are they informative about how shares will change if the sex ratio changes.
To investigate how substitution a⁄ects the decision to marry and vice versa,
we need a statistic that will link the two e⁄ects. To that end, let ￿t
ij be the










; i = 1;::;I;j = 1;::J (6)
The numerator is the number of fi;jg marriages. The denominator is the
geometric average of the number of unmarrieds. Total gains, ￿t
ij, provides a




i, for all i and j, we can recover the marriage distribution, ￿t
ij.
Thus ￿t
ij is an accounting scheme for marriage distributions.










jji; i = 1;::;I;j = 1;::J (7)
The total gains to fi;jg marriages is the average of the log odds of marriages
for i type men and j type men plus the average of the log shares. Thus total
gains to marriage combines substitution patterns with marriage rates.





















; i = 1;::;I;j = 1;::J (8)
￿t
0
ij for all i and j is a complete description of the marriage distribution in





ij for all i and j is a complete description of the
13It cannot deal with marital choices with zero observation. I.e. ￿t
ij must be ￿nite.
7changes in the marriage distributions between the two periods.14
Tautologically, changes in total gains, ￿￿t
0t
ij , are due to both changes in
population supplies and changes in marital preferences. In order to disentangle
observed changes in marital behavior between e⁄ects due to changes in marital
preference and e⁄ects due to population supplies, we need a model of marital
behavior. CS is such a model. It provides a behavioral derivation of ￿t
ij. In
their model, total gains measures the expected marital gain to a random fi;jg
pair marrying relative to them not marrying. The thought experiment is as
follows. Consider a randomly chosen a type i male marrying a randomly chosen
type j female. We compare the marital output of this random chosen couple
to the geometric average of what they would have obtained if they had remain
unmarried. So once the individuals are chosen, they could only compare whether
to marry or forever remain unmarried. This measure of relative expected marital
gain is una⁄ected by marriage market conditions because we are not choosing
the couple based on relative scarcity, nor do we allow them to marry other
individuals.
Thus in CS, ￿t
ij are exogenous, independent of population vectors, nt
i and
nt





j for all i and j using equations (6), we can predict
what the new marriage distribution b ￿t
0





j , and ￿t
0
ij = ￿t
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i )(nt0
j ￿ b ￿t0
j )
; i = 1;::;I;j = 1;::J (9)
In our context, let time t individuals be those whose marital behavior were
una⁄ected by the famine. Let t0 individuals be those who were a⁄ected by
the famine. If the only e⁄ect of the famine was to change population supplies
between t and t0, then ￿t
0
ij = ￿t
ij and the marital distribution at time t0 should
be b ￿t
0
ij as in the system of equations (9).
So if the new actual marriage distribution, ￿t
0
ij, di⁄ers from the predicted
marriage distribution, b ￿t
0
ij, the total gains of marriage must have changed be-
tween the old and the new environments, i.e. ￿t
0
ij 6= ￿t
ij for at least some fi;jg.
Because total gains completely describe the marriage distribution, the previous
statement is always true. Without a model of marital behavior, we do not know
how much of ￿￿t
0t
ij is due to changes in marital attractiveness and how much
is due to changes in population supplies. The bite of CS is that it implies that
￿￿t
0t
ij , the changes in total gains, only measure changes in marital attractiveness
due to the famine.
In demography, CS is known as a MMF with substitution e⁄ects. The stan-
dard demographic MMF is the harmonic mean MMF (E.g. Schoen 1981) which
14CS has a proof of local uniqueness. Although there is no proof of global uniqueness, our
experience with it using US (CS), Canadian (Choo and Siow 2006a) and Chinese data here









The absence of substitution e⁄ects means that changes in ni0 for i 6= i0 or
nj0 for j 6= j0 will not a⁄ect ￿ij. ￿ij also describes the marriage distribution
completely. But if CS is correct, ￿ij is a function of marital preferences as well
as population vectors. Using estimated ￿ij to predict changes in the marriage
distribution due to population changes will result in biased predictions. As will
be discussed later, the harmonic mean MMF generates inadmissible predictions
in our context.15
Summary Data and Sex Ratios
All the data presented here come from the one percent household sample of the
1982 Census of China and the one percent clustered sample of the 1990 Census
of China. Wang (2000) and Mason and Lavely (2001) are useful resources on the
details of the censuses and data samples. In our analysis, we only use those data
pertaining to individuals who reside in rural counties. This can be rationalized
on two grounds: ￿rst, the countryside was more a⁄ected by the famine than the
cities,16 and second, the rural marriage market was largely self-contained, and
highly local in nature. There was some cross-provincial migration for marriage,
but the numbers are relatively small. In the Data Appendix, we discuss how
rural is de￿ned, and several other data-related issues, including migration.
Tables 1 and 2 provide some summary statistics for rural counties in Anhui
and Sichuan from the 1982 and 1990 censuses. The average spousal age dif-
ferences in the two provinces ranged between two to four years. Any observed
spousal age di⁄erence is an equilibrium outcome determined by marriage mar-
ket conditions. Under average marriage market conditions existing in China at
the times of the 1982 and 1990 censuses, the average spousal age di⁄erence was
about three years. Because the censuses collect ages by years, we assume that
the customary equilibrium spousal age di⁄erence is three years.
The ￿rst-order impact of the famine on the marital behavior of individu-
als would have been on the famine-born cohort and their customary spouses.
For men who usually marry women three years younger, the customary spouses
for the famine-born men were the post-famine-born women. For famine-born
women, their customary spouses were the pre famine-born men. Thus, we con-
sider individuals born between 1956 to 1964 to be the famine-a⁄ected cohorts.
We observe the marital behavior of individuals in 1982 and 1990. For conve-
nience, the ages of these individuals in 1990 are given below.
15The search for empirically tractable MMF with substitution e⁄ects is ongoing (Pollak
1990, Pollard 1997). CS provides a solution.
16See footnote 10.
9Pre famine Famine Post famine
Birth years 1956-1958 1959-1961 1962-1964
1982 ages 24-26 21-23 18-20
1990 ages 32-34 29-31 26-28
Our main interest is to examine the behavior of the famine on marital be-
havior in the 1990 census. The reason for focusing on the 1990 census is that
by 1990, the post-famine cohort was 26-28 years old. Most women of that age
category and older would have acquired their permanent marital status. Except
for 26 and 27 year olds, most men of that age category and older would also
have acquired their permanent marital status.
We will use individuals of the same age and characteristics in 1982 as con-
trols for their counterparts in 1990. That is, the control group for post famine
individuals are those who were 26-28 in 1982, the control group for famine-born
cohort are those who were 29-31 in 1982, and the control group for the pre-
famine cohort are those who were 32-34 in 1982. In general, as shown in the
immediate table above, individuals in the control groups, of age 26 and older
in 1982, were not a⁄ected at birth by the famine. There is one year of overlap.
Individuals of age 26 in 1982, used as a control group for pre-famine 26 year olds
in 1990, are also in the post-famine group in 1990. There was also no signi￿cant
social or legal change to the labor and marriage markets between 1982 and 1990.
Thus, it is reasonable to use individuals of the same age and characteristics in
1982 as controls for their counterparts in 1990.
2 Sichuan
Figure 1 shows the number of individuals by age in rural counties in Sichuan in
1990. The pre-famine cohort, 32-34, were a⁄ected by the famine. There were
less of them than 35 or 36 year olds. Absent the famine, due to population
growth and mortality risk, there should be less older individuals rather than
more in a given census year. Thus the 32-34 year olds were adversely a⁄ected
by the famine.
The famine-born cohort, 29-31, is substantially smaller than the adjacent
cohorts, re￿ ecting primarily the fall in the birth rates of that cohort. Recovery
of the birth rates after the famine was very rapid. There is no visible impact of
the famine on cohort sizes after 1964, ages 25 or younger in 1990.
Figure 1 also shows that there were less 35 and 36 year olds than 37 olds,
which implies that these cohorts were also a⁄ected by the famine. We do not
directly study their marital behavior because of our focus on the marital behav-
ior of the famine-born cohort with their adjacent aged peers. The analysis of
the famine-a⁄ected cohorts takes into account that they could and did marry
these 35 year olds and older individuals in 1990.
102.1 Marriage rates
Figure 2 shows two sex ratios by age. The dashed line is the sex ratio of men
to women for same age men and women. It shows that the famine had little
to no impact on the sex ratio; there is no evidence that male children were
favored over female children among the famine-a⁄ected cohorts. The solid line
is the sex ratio by women￿ s age where the men were three years older than the
women. Here, the e⁄ect of the famine is very clear. The sex ratio was above
2.5 for famine-born women because there were relatively more pre-famine-born
men. Also the sex ratio fell to 0.25 for post-famine-born women because there
was a relative scarcity of famine-born men. If individuals valued the customary
age of marriage, there should have been large marriage market e⁄ects on the
famine-a⁄ected cohorts.
Figure 3 plots the marriages rates for men and women by age in 1990 and
1982. In both census years and at all ages, female marriage rates exceed 0.95
whereas male marriage rates are less than 0.9.
For women younger than age 40, marriage rates for women of the same age
were essentially the same in 1990 and 1982. In other words, the famine-a⁄ected
women in 1990 had the same marriage rates as their same age peers in 1982.
Figure 2 earlier showed that the famine-born women were in relative scarcity
and the post-famine women were in relative surplus when compared to their
customary spouses. This strongly suggests that the famine-a⁄ected women also
married non-customary spouses and that these substitutions to a ￿rst order left
the marriage rates of famine-a⁄ected women unchanged.
In 1990, the marriage rates for famine-a⁄ected men were di⁄erent from un-
a⁄ected cohorts. The marriage rates of pre-famine-born men, 32-34, were lower
than their adjacent older peers. They were also lower than that of the famine-
born men, 29-31. Interestingly, post famine-born men had higher marriage rates
than the famine-born men even though post famine-born men were not scarce
relative to their customary spouses.
Compared with 1982 men of the same ages, the marriage rates of pre famine-
born men in 1990 were not signi￿cantly di⁄erent. Thus the lower marriage rates
of pre famine-born men in 1990 compared to their adjacent older peers may have
been a lifecycle e⁄ect rather than a famine-related e⁄ect.
Compared with 1982 men of the same ages, the marriage rates of famine and
post famine-born men in 1990 were signi￿cantly higher. Thus, both within year
comparisons in 1990 and across years comparisons suggest that the marriage
rates of famine and post famine-born men were positively a⁄ected by the famine.
Based on marriage rates between 1990 and 1982, a tentative conclusion is
that the marriage rates of famine-a⁄ected women in 1990 were unchanged. The
marriage rates of pre famine-born men were una⁄ected whereas the marriage
rates of famine-born and post famine-born men increased in 1990. These con-
clusions are summarized in Figure 4. The marriage rates of famine-born men
increased by less than 5 percent compared to their 1982 peers. The marriage
rates of post famine-born men increased by substantially more, 5 to 15 percent
more than their 1982 peers. But famine-born men are scarce. It is therefore
11surprising that their increased marriage rates were so modest.
Previous researchers who have studied marriage rates and large exogenous
sex ratio changes in other contexts have also often found small e⁄ects of these
changes on marriage rates, e.g. Bergstrom and Lam (1994) and Bhrolchain
(2001). As we do in this paper, these researchers interpret these small e⁄ects as
due to ￿ exible spousal choices in the face of large changes in sex ratios. But there
are anomalies in these common ￿ndings of small e⁄ects. If a large change in the
sex ratio leads to a particular gender and age cohort being relatively scarce in
the marriage market, that cohort should experience a substantial increase in its
marriage rate. It is anomalous that the increased marriage rates of famine-born
men in 1990 compared to their 1982 peers were signi￿cantly smaller than the
post famine-born men. The behavior is less puzzling for famine-born women
because marriage rates for women were already high. The marriage rate of
famine-born women in 1990 could not have been signi￿cantly higher. On the
other hand, it is anomalous that the marriage rate of post-famine women in
1990 was not signi￿cantly lower than their famine-born counterparts because
the post-famine women were in relative surplus.
To get an appreciation of the quantitative discrepancies to be explained and
the ￿rst order importance of accounting for general equilibrium considerations,
we estimate the CS MMF using 1982 data where the type of an individual
is their age.17 With the same data, we also estimate the parameters of the
harmonic mean MMF. Using the estimates from the two models and population
supplies in 1990, we predict what the 1990 marriages rates would have been due
to changes in population supplies alone.
Figures 4b and 4c show for Sichuan, the predicted male and female marriage
rates from the two models respectively. For both genders, the predicted marriage
rates from the harmonic mean MMF often exceed 1, an inadmissible prediction.
These violations occurred because the harmonic mean MMF does not impose
required general equilibrium accounting identities and the changes in sex ratios
of customary spousal age di⁄erences were large. Thus as previous researchers
have observed, the standard MMF used by demographers is a poor empirical
MMF.
On the other hand, the predicted marriage rates from the CS MMF behave
sensibly. In ￿gures 4b and 4c, the predicted marriage rates are above average
for the famine-born cohorts and below average for the adjacent aged birth co-
horts. No accounting constraint is violated. Note that actual female marriage
rates were over 0.95 for most ages. Even with large changes in sex ratios of
the customary spousal age di⁄erences for the famine-born cohorts, their pre-
dicted marriage rates remained below 1. The predicted female marriage rates
for famine-born cohorts were very similar to those predicted for adjacent aged
cohorts. In other words, the CS MMF respects both the general equilibrium
accounting constraints of MMFs and also captures the ￿ exibility of individuals
in their marital choices. These two attributes show the advantage of the CS
MMF over the harmonic mean MMF.
17Details of the the estimation are in section 2.3.
12In ￿gure 4b, famine born males had lower marriage rates than predicted
by CS and pre famine-born males had higher marriage rates than predicted by
CS. So changes in relative scarcities of the di⁄erent types of individuals caused
by the famine cannot explain these discrepancies. The famine must have also
changed marital attractiveness or total gains to marriage for these cohorts.
Figure 4c shows that the discrepancies between predicted and actual female
marriage rates were small. CS is able to generate predicted male marriage
rates that substantially responded to changes in population supplies and female
marriage rates that marginally responded. It is clear that changes in population
supplies alone cannot explain the observed changes in marriage rates. We also
need to account for changes in marital attractiveness of the famine-a⁄ected
cohorts.
2.2 Marriage shares
To set the stage, it is convenient to have an idea of what customary marital
shares were. Figure 5 plots the distributions of husbands by spousal age dif-
ferences for women who were 33, 30 and 27 in 1982. Because they were born
substantially before the famine, the marital behavior of 1982 women of those
ages should have been una⁄ected by the famine. We di⁄erentiate husbands by
their age gaps over their wives, from -3 years to +6 years. Husbands within
these 10 years ages interval account for 83-96% of all husbands. The ￿gure
shows that there is essentially no di⁄erence in the distributions of husbands by
spousal age di⁄erences for these di⁄erent aged women in 1982. The marital
behavior of 1982 women of those ages was una⁄ected by the famine; and their
spousal choices as represented by spousal age di⁄erences did not change with
their age in 1982.
Turning to the e⁄ects of the famine, Figure 6 shows the marital partners of
three age cohorts of women in 1990: 27 (post famine-born), 30 (famine-born)
and 33 (pre famine-born). First consider 33 year old women who were born
before the famine. Since women generally marry older men, Figure 2 tells us
that the customary husbands of these women are not scarce. 90% of their
husbands were in the 10 years age interval with the remainder primarily among
older men. The largest share of husbands was two years older. For 33 year old
women in 1990, the age distribution of their spouses looks the same as their
same age peers in 1982 in Figure 5.
30 year old women were famine-born women. They are scarce relative to
their customary husbands. Compared with the shares of 33 year old women,
their marriage shares distribution shifted to the right. Although they could
replicate the share distribution of the pre-famine women because they were
scarce relative to older men, more of them chose to marry older husbands. One
potential explanation is that they avoided competing with younger women.
27 year old women were born after the famine. They su⁄er a relative scarcity
of customary husbands. As shown in the ￿gure, their marriage share distribution
is almost symmetric around age gap [￿2;2]. It ￿ attens out between age gap
2 to 4 and then increases. Thus, post-famine women married a much larger
13share of own age or younger men, and also signi￿cantly older men. The share of
husbands in the age gap [￿2;2] was 0.83. A larger share of these women married
signi￿cantly older men than the other cohorts of women. Figure 6 shows that in
1990, the distributions of husbands by spousal age di⁄erences were signi￿cantly
di⁄erent between pre famine-born, famine-born and post famine-born women.
Using the behavior of women in 1982 as control groups, Figure 7 plots the
ratio of 1990 husbands￿shares to 1982 shares for 27, 30 and 33 year old women.
If there is no di⁄erence in shares between 1982 and 1990 for the same age women,
then the ratio should be 1. Consider the case of 33 year old women. The ratio
of shares are slightly above 1 for age gap between [0,4]. In both 1982 and 1990,
most of the husbands of these 33 year old women fell in the age gap between
[0,4] years. The ratio of shares are lower than 1 outside [0,4]. This says that in
the [0,4] range, and to a ￿rst approximation, pre famine-born women in 1990
had the same relative distribution of husbands by spousal age di⁄erences as
their 1982 counterparts. But pre-famine women in 1990 had substantially less
younger or older husbands outside the range. Less younger husbands can be
explained by the relative scarcity of famine-born men. Why older men outside
the range was lower in 1990 will be discussed later.
Famine-born women in 1990, age 30, behaved very di⁄erently from their 1982
counterparts. They were far more likely to marry older men and far less likely
to marry men of the same age or younger. Since these women are relatively
scarce, they could have married their customary partners. But they did not do
so.
Post-famine women in 1990, age 27, also behaved very di⁄erently from their
1982 counterparts. They were far more likely to marry same age or younger men,
also pre famine-born men, and far less likely to marry famine-born men. So here,
post-famine women avoided the scarce famine-born men. What is interesting is
that their increased demand for substantially older, pre famine-born men. Both
27 and 30 year old women in 1990 had relatively more demand for signi￿cantly
older men, which may partially explain why 33 year old women in 1990 had
relatively lower demand for husbands older than 4 years.
Taken as a whole, Figure 7 shows that di⁄erent cohorts of famine-a⁄ected
women responded di⁄erently in their spousal choices. This ￿nding is anticipated
by the observation that female marriage rates did not di⁄er much across di⁄erent
cohorts of famine-a⁄ected women.
2.3 Total gains
To preview what we will ￿nd, recall that marriages rates of famine-born women
were the same as their pre and post famine-born peers. The marriage rates of
famine-born men were lower than their post famine-born peers. But famine-
born men and women are relatively scarce in the marriage market. Let j denote
the cohort of famine-born women and i denote their customary spouses. To a
￿rst order, ot
j did not change and j type women are scarce relative to type i men.
st
jji must fall and by equation (7), ￿t
ij must fall. Under the CS interpretation,
the expected gains to marriage for a random fi;jg pair relative to them not
14marrying must have fallen.
Another way to see that total gains must have changed, we estimate total
gains ￿1982
ij for every {i;jg match where a type is de￿ned by the individual￿ s
age. Then we use the estimated total gains, ￿1982
ij , to predict what the marriage
distribution in 1990 would be if the only change in 1990 were changes in the
population vectors, b ￿1990
ij .18
Figure 8 plots the ratio of own gender predicted marriage rate in 1990, b r1990
g ,
to r1990
g , the actual marriage rate in 1990 by age, b r1990
g (r1990
g )￿1. The ratio for
women is marginally above one for the famine-born cohort, age 29-31, and the
pre famine-born cohort, age 32-34. It is signi￿cantly lower than one for the
post famine-born cohort, age 26-28. This behavior implies that total gains to
marriage must have changed between the two periods. The change in total gains
is more apparent in the male ratio. Here, the ratio is less than one for both pre
and post famine-born males, and it is sigi￿cantly larger than one for famine-born
males. In other words, if total gains did not change for the famine-born cohort,
their predicted marriages rates would have been signi￿cantly higher than what
was observed. Instead, their adjacent birth cohorts bene￿ted in the marriage
market.
To investigate the change in total gains for famine-a⁄ected cohorts, we ￿rst
consider total gains of individuals who were born before the famine. Figure 9
shows total gains for 27, 30 and 33 year old women and their spouses from -3
years to +6 years older in 1982. Total gains for 30 and 33 year old women and
their spouses were similar in 1982. Total gains for 27 year old women, while
similar in shape, were slightly lower than the other two age cohorts.
Figure 10 plots total gains of three age cohorts of women in 1990, 27 (post
famine-born), 30 (famine-born) and 33 (pre famine-born) and their husbands.
Starting with pre famine-born 33 year old women and their spouses, total gains
is a smooth concave function in husband￿ s age gap. Total gains from [0,4] were
relatively similar. Total gains of post famine-born 27 year old women and their
spouses were in general similar to the pre famine women. Where they di⁄er, and
total gains were lower for post-famine women, were with husbands between 1 to
3 years older. For post famine-born women, these husbands were famine-born
men. Thus, marrying famine-born men resulted in lower total gains to marriage
relative to the pre-famine women with spouses 1 to 3 years older.
Total gains for famine-born women, age 30, and their spouses were signi￿-
cantly lower than that of pre and post famine-born women. This means that
the gains to marrying for famine-born women and their spouses were generally
lower than for their pre and post-famine counterparts. The way to understand
this ￿nding is as follows. Figure 3 shows that the marriage rates of famine-
born women were similar to pre and post-famine women. There are some small
di⁄erences in the marriage rates of the husbands (measured by age gaps) of
famine-born and other famine-a⁄ected women. But there were large di⁄erences
18As an alternative to CS, we also estimated the Schoen￿ s harmonic mean mating rule
parameters using the 1982 data. We then used the estimates and the 1990 population vectors
to generate marriage rates for 1990. This model generated predicted marriage rates for females
in excess of 100% which is inadmissible.
15in the customary marriage sex ratios as shown in Figure 2. These large di⁄er-
ences in the customary marriage sex ratios should have resulted in signi￿cantly
di⁄erent marriage rates for famine-born and other famine a⁄ected women. But
because the marriage rates for all the famine-a⁄ected women were roughly the
same in spite of large di⁄erences in customary marital sex ratios, total gains for
the famine-born women had to be lower than the other famine-a⁄ected women.
This interpretation was anticipated by the lower total gains that post famine-
born women obtained from marrying famine-born men relative pre famine-born
women marrying men with the same age gap.
As we discussed in the introduction, the lower total gains for famine-born
women and men in marriage is highly suggestive of the lower ￿quality￿of these
individuals as spouses. Thus we may tentatively conclude that famine-born men
and women were damaged by the famine.
Figure 11 presents the di⁄erence in total gains between 1990 and 1982 for
the same age women and their spouses. The di⁄erences in total gains were
negative for the famine-born women, age 30, for all spousal ages. The gains were
particularly low in marriages with same age or younger men. So for famine-
born women, their bene￿t in the marriage market from relative scarcity was
completely erased by their drop in quality as spouses.
The di⁄erence in total gains for 33 year old women between the two censuses
was roughly zero. Excluding the level e⁄ect, the di⁄erence in total gains for 27
year old women was high for same age, younger and signi￿cantly older men,
and signi￿cantly lower for slightly older men. Using the CS interpretation of
total gains, post-famine women ￿preferred￿to marry same age, younger or much
older men, rather than their customary spouses, famine-born men.
2.4 Education e⁄ects
Since the famine had a negative impact on the health and human capital endow-
ments of famine-born individuals (see Almond et. al. (2007), Gorgens et. al.
(2005), St. Clair et. al. (2005), Luo, Mu and Zhang (2006)), their educational
attainment may have been a⁄ected. This may enable us to use the change in
educational attainment of that cohort to proxy for their drop in marital attrac-
tiveness, thereby explaining their drop in total gains to marriage.
Figure 12 shows the fraction of women who had less than a primary school
education by age. Not surprising, in both the 1990 and 1982 censuses, the
fraction grew with the age of the women. It is di¢ cult to see the change in
educational attainment at the levels for the famine-born cohort. This implies
that it is unlikely that the change in educational attainment of the famine-born
cohort will be able to explain the changes in total gains to marriage of that
cohort.
Figure 13 shows the log di⁄erence (growth rate) of the fraction of women
who had less than a primary school education by age. In the 1982 census, the
growth rate fell rapidly by age for women below age 35. Such a decline in the
growth rate should be expected if women increased their educational attainment
over time. In the 1990 census, the growth rate also fell by age for women above
16age 32. For women between age 28 and 32, the growth rate of the fraction of
women with less than a primary school eduction formed a valley with a bottom
at age 30. Based on deviations from trend growth, the famine-a⁄ected cohorts
had less education than they would otherwise have. Although we do not present
the results here, the results for male educational attainment are similar. Figure
13 raises the possibility that changes in the growth rate of education of the
famine-a⁄ected cohorts may be able to explain some of the fall in total gains to
marriage of those cohorts.
Denote individuals with more than a primary education as high education
and those with a primary education or less as low education. Figure 14 shows
the ratio of 1990 to 1982 female marriage rates by age and education. High
education women were less likely to marry in 1990 than in 1982 compared with
their low education peers. For high educated famine-born women (age 30),
the ratio is slightly higher than their adjacent aged peers. For low educated
famine-born women, the ratio is slightly lower than their adjacent aged peers.
These small di⁄erences in marriage rates suggest that high educated famine-
born women may have fared better than their low education counterparts.
To evaluate the overall e⁄ects of the changes in educational attainment on
marital behavior, we estimate total gains ￿1982
ij for every {i;jg match where a
type is de￿ned by the individual￿ s age and education (high versus low). We
then use the estimated total gains, ￿1982
ij , to predict the marriage distribution
in 1990, b ￿1990
ij , due to changes in population vectors alone. Figure 15 plots the
ratio of the own predicted gender marriage rates in 1990 to the actual marriage
rates in 1990 by age, b rt
g(rt
g)￿1, g = i;j.
Figure 15, where predictions depend on age and education, looks remarkably
similar to Figure 8 where the predictions only depend on age. In other words,
the change in educational attainment of the famine-born cohort did not have a
￿rst order impact on predicted marriage rates.
To examine this more closely, Figure 16 plots 1990-1982 total gains for mar-
riages with two high educated spouses. Total gains for post-famine women were
higher than their 1982 peers. But note that relative total gains for post-famine
women married fell as the age of their husbands increased from own age to
famine-born husbands. So famine-born men also had lower total gains. To-
tal gains for famine-born and pre-famine women were slightly lower than their
1982 peers. Figure 17 plots total gains for marriages with two low educated
spouses. Total gains for pre and post-famine women were higher than their
1982 peers. On the other hand, total gains for famine-born women were sub-
stantially lower than their 1982 peers. Figures 16 and 17 suggest that among
famine-born women, low educated women su⁄ered a larger drop in total gains
than high educated women.
3 Anhui
In general, the e⁄ects of the famine on the marital behavior of the famine-
a⁄ected cohorts in Anhui were about the same as for Sichuan.
17Figure 1a and 2a present the number of individuals by age in 1990 in Anhui,
and the same age sex ratio as well as the sex ratio for men three years older
by female age. These two ￿gures are similar to what we saw for Sichuan. In
particular, the timing of the e⁄ects of the famine on birth rates in both provinces
were the same.
Figure 3a shows the male and female marriage rates in 1982 and 1990. As
the ￿gure shows, female marriage rates between 1982 and 1990 were very sim-
ilar. Across most ages, male marriage rates were lower in 1982. One potential
explanation for the higher male marriage rates in 1990 is that relatively more
unmarried men left the province in 1990 than in 1982. At this point, we are
unble to compute how many individuals left the province in 1990 and 1982. This
explanation bears further investigation.
To see the e⁄ects of the famine more clearly, Figure 4a shows the ratio of 1990
to 1982 marriage rates by gender and age. There is a small dip in the marriage
rate of famine-born females relative to pre and post famine-born cohorts. This
dip is more visible for males. Quantitatively, the e⁄ects are not large, within
2-3% di⁄erence. These dips are di⁄erent from their Sichuan counterparts.
Note however that because famine-born individuals are relatively scarce,
these dips in marriage rates should be re￿ ected in signi￿cant drops in total
gains for famine-born individuals.
Figure 5a shows that in 1982, Anhui women at ages 27, 30 and 33 had very
similar shares of husbands by spousal age di⁄erences. Figure 6a shows that in
1990, Anhui women at ages 27, 30 and 33 had di⁄erent shares of husbands by
spousal age di⁄erences.
Figure 7a shows the 1990 shares divided by the 1982 shares. For 1990 33
years old wives (pre-famine-born females), their shares of same age or older
husbands were roughly the same as for the 1982 wives. On the other hand, the
1990 share of younger husbands (famine-born males) were lower than their 1982
peers.
For 1990 30 years old (famine-born) wives, their shares of own age hus-
bands were lower than older or younger husbands compared with their 1982
peers. Finally, 1990 27 years old (post-famine) wives, their shares of own age
spouses were signi￿cantly higher than famine-born spouses, but comparable to
pre famine-born spouses when compared with their 1982 peers. That is, post
famine-born wives were more likely to have own age or pre famine-born spouses.
The behavior of 33 years old (pre-famine) and 27 years old (post-famine)
wives with respect to their choices of husbands were similar to that of Sichuan
women. However famine-born Anhui wives were more likely to marry own aged
spouses compared with their Sichuan counterparts.
Figure 8a shows the ratio of 1990 predicted marriage rates by age to actual
marriage rates using ￿82
ij where the type of an individual is de￿ned by their
age. The model underpredicts the number of marriages for post famine-born
women. It substantially over predicts the number of married famine-born men,
and under predicts the marriage rates of pre- and post- famine-born men. Thus
we know that total gains must have changed between 1982 and 1990 for the
same age groups.
18Figure 9a shows the total gains for 27, 30 and 33 years old women in 1982.
Although the shape of the three curves are similar, total gains for 27 years old
women were lower than for 30 and 33 years old women. Figure 10a shows the
total gains for 27, 30 and 33 years old women in 1990. Total gains for 30 years
old women were signi￿cantly lower than for 33 years old and roughly comparable
to 27 year olds. Total gains for own age spouses for 30 year old women were
lower than those for pre and post-famine women.
Figure 11a shows 1990 total gains minus 1982 total gains. The most stark
feature is that the di⁄erence in total gains for 30 year old women were lower than
that for 27 and 33 year old women at all spousal age di⁄erences. In other words,
famine-born women were less desirable as spouses compared to their same age
counterparts in 1982.
For 33 year old women (i.e the pre-famine cohort and their same age coun-
terparts), the di⁄erence in total gains were above zero with own age and older
husbands. It was lower than zero for younger (famine-born) husbands. Finally,
total gains for 27 year old (post famine-born) women were higher than their
1982 peers for own age and younger men, but lower than their 1982 peers for
older (famine-born) men. Thus Figure 11a unambiguously show that famine-
born individuals had lower total gains to marriage compared with 1982 same
age peers or with pre and post famine-born individuals.
Figures 12a and 13a show the fraction of women with primary or lower
education and the growth in that fraction by age in 1990 and 1982 respectively.
As in Sichuan, educational attainment declined with age. In Figure 13a, there
is a sharp jump in the growth rate of low education famine-born, age 30, women
which shows that the famine-born generation had less educational attainment
than expected. But as shown in Figure 12a, the level e⁄ect is small.
Figure 14a shows the ratio of 1990 to 1982 female marriage rates. For women
with low education, the marriage rates of the famine-born cohort were slightly
lower than pre and post famine-born women. For women with high education,
famine-born women su⁄er a larger dip in their marriage rates relative to pre
and post famine-born women.
Figure 15a shows the ratio of predicted marriage rates by age to actual
marriage rates using ￿82
ij where the type of an individual is de￿ned by their
age and education. The Figure is almost identical to Figure 8a where the type
of an individual is de￿ned by age alone. What this means is that accounting
for the changes in educational attainment between same age 1982 and 1990
indviduals did not account for the changes in marital quality of the famine-born
individuals.
Figure 16a shows 1990 minus 1982 total gains for high educated women with
high educated men. famine-born high educated women (age 30) had weakly
lower total gains compared with their 1982 peers. Total gains for pre famine-
born high educated women were roughly the same as their 1982 peers. Post
famine-born educated women had higher total gains than their 1982 peers, al-
though there was a small relative dip with older (famine-born) men.
Figure 17a shows 1990 minus 1982 total gains for low educated women with
low educated men. famine-born low educated women (age 30) had signi￿cantly
19lower total gains compared with their 1982 peers. Total gains were relatively
higher with same age males. Total gains for pre famine-born high educated
women were roughly the same as their 1982 peers for own age and older men.
They were lower with younger (famine-born) men. Post famine-born educated
women had the same total gains than their 1982 peers with own age or pre
famine-born men. They had lower gains with famine-born men.
Comparing ￿gures 16a and 17a, high educated famine-born individuals suf-
fered a smaller loss in total gains to marriage than their low educated counter-
parts. This ￿nding is comparable to that for Sichuan.
4 Conclusion
From our analysis of marital behavior in rural Sichuan and Anhui, our conclusion
is that, at a ￿rst approximation, famine-born individuals su⁄ered a signi￿cant
drop in marital quality with non-famine-born potential spouses. To compensate
for their drop in marital quality with non-famine-born potential spouses, famine-
born individuals tended to marry own age spouses, and thus avoid marrying
their customary aged spouses. In other words, the variations in customary
sex ratios caused by the famine had a small e⁄ect on marriage rates because
famine-born individuals were more likely to marry their own, and non-famine-
born individuals married other non-famine-born individuals rather than their
customary famine-born potential spouses.
Comparing our ￿ndings with previous work on the e⁄ects of demographic
shocks on marital outcomes, we agree with their ￿nding that individuals show
substantial ￿ exibility in their choices of spouses. In other words, for most indi-
viduals, marrying, albeit to a non-customary spouse, is substantially preferable
to remaining unmarried. However, when there is large non-unitary sex ratios
at customary marriage age di⁄erences, an una⁄ected marriage rate for a⁄ected
individual imply that those individuals su⁄ered a strong loss in marital attrac-
tiveness. This was the fate of famine-born individuals in China.
Data Appendix
All data are either from the 1% household sample of the 1982 Census of China,
or the 1% clustered sample of the 1990 Census of China. Our samples are
individuals in rural counties of Sichuan and Anhui, over the age of 18. There
are issues common to both censuses, as well as di⁄erences between them, that
required attention for the analysis in this paper. This appendix describes the
most important of those issues.
Sampling. The microdata sample for 1982 was sampled at the household
level, while the 1990 ￿clustered￿sample was sampled at the level of the admin-
istrative unit. Lavely and Mason (2006) discusses the geographic coverage of the
1990 sample and compares summary statistics from the sample to tabulations
from the complete census. They concludes that, aside from a few discrepencies,
20the sample ￿reproduces the geographic distribution of population and major
population components quite well.￿We would not expect the di⁄erent sampling
methods to bias our results. The marriage markets we investigate are de facto
de￿ned as the subset of rural counties in each province. While the two cen-
sus samples will contain exactly the same counties, they ought to both have a
representative sample of rural households in each province.
De￿ning rural areas. Our analysis covers rural counties in Sichuan and
Anhui. There has been much research and debate about the best de￿nitions
of rural and urban populations for various purposes (see Chan (1994), Martin
(1992) and Shen (1995). The ￿o¢ cial￿de￿nitions in fact changed between the
1985 and 1990 censuses. Our intention, in analyzing only rural areas, is to look
at those areas most severely a⁄ected by the famine, and avoid con￿ ating the
very di⁄erent e⁄ects su⁄ered by cities and villages. Also, since the 1982 and
1990 use di⁄erent classi￿cations for the smaller geographic units, we wanted to
select geographic areas on criteria which could be consistently applied in both
censuses.
Both censuses de￿ne the largest three levels of geographic units according
to a six digit goubiao (GB) code. The ￿rst two digits de￿ne the province (or
municipalities like Beijing and Tianjin, which report directly to the central
government). The second two digits de￿ne a prefecture within the province,
and the last two label the counties within the prefecture. See Chan (1994) for
a diagram of these levels in the two censuses. Within Sichuan and Anhui, we
select those counties whose last two digits indicate they are xian (as opposed to
shi or shixiaqu, which refer to urban areas). This de￿nition will generally not
capture the same households as those included in the o¢ cial de￿nition.19
Migration. Fan and Huang (1998) document substantial marriage-related
migration between certain provinces from 1985 to 1990. They ￿nd that in
Sichuan, particularly, a large number of women migrated out of the province for
marriage-related reasons. Of our sample of over 433 thousand married women in
Sichuan in 1990 ￿ only the 1990 census contains migration data￿ about 0.93%
moved to their current county from another county or province for marriage. Of
those who migrated from other provinces, they largely came from Guizhou and
Yunnan. Out of over 240 thousand married women in our 1990 Anhui sample,
about 0.8% moved to their current county from another county or province for
marriage; Sichuan, Henan, and Jiangsu were the main sources of inter-provincial
marriage migrants. There are about 3,057 women in the 1990 sample who
migrated for marriage from Sichuan to another province between 1985 and 1990,
while 410 women did so from Anhui to another province during that time.
Jiangsu￿ a coastal province experiencing rapid economic growth￿ was the most
frequent destination for marriage migrants from both Anhui and Sichuan.
Though marriage migration is an important and interesting response to the
famine-caused imbalance in sex ratios, our analysis requires no special account-
ing for migration. Any impact of migration prior to 1990 will be accounted for
19In earlier versions of the analyses, we also used a de￿nition based on the share of individ-
uals working in rural sectors. This de￿nition resulted in a similar sample of counties.
21in the 1990 sex ratios, which are the inputs to the MMFs.
De￿ning married couples within households. Except for household
heads and their spouses, the census does not provide any de￿nite way to deter-
mine who is married to whom within the household. Also, it provides no way
to identify a person￿ s spouse if that spouse does not live in the same household.
For example, a male and female household member whose marital statuses are
both ￿Married￿ and are identi￿ed ￿Children of the household head￿ may be
married to each other (and one is a son-in-law or daughter-in-law). Or it is
possible that they are both biological children of the household head who are
married to spouses living outside the household.
Assuming that the ￿rst possibility is the more likely, we determine the mar-
ried couples within households according to the following rules. First, we iden-
tify all ￿potential￿married couples within each households as those who are of
the opposite sex and have consistent relationships to the household head (both
children of the head, or parents of the head, etc.). For children of household
heads, we also required that potential couples be within ￿ve years of age.20 If
each person in the household has only one potential spouse, we de￿ne them to
be married. If a person has multiple potential spouses, we assign married cou-
ples through positive assortive matching by age, e.g., the oldest married male
child is married to the oldest married female child within ￿ve years his age.
Determining spouses was by far most problematic for children of house-
hold Heads, simply because there were more of these than parents, grandpar-
ents, grandchildren, etc. Fortunately, in the majority of households, there was
only one potential married couple amongst the children.21 In Sichuan, amongst
households where there was at least one potential married child couple, 93.3%
had only one potential couple, while 99.6% had two potential combinations or
less. In Anhui, household sizes were slightly larger, as only 83% of households
with at least one potential child couple had only one potential couple, while
93.6% had no more than two potential combinations.
Imputing missing spouses. For some individuals, there were no potential
spouses in their household; for example, there were households where the house-
hold head was married, but no spouse was present; or there were households
with an odd number of married children. We imputed the age and education of
these individuals￿spouses by assigning values randomly from the distribution
of spouse age and eduction for those of the same sex and age in that province
with non-missing spouses.
20We performed tests of these rules by relaxing the age assumption, and comparing marriage
age distributions of the full sample with the restricted sample of household heads and their
spouses.
21We calculate the potential married couple combinations amongst children in a household
to be P(I;J) if J < I, or P(J;I) otherwise, where I is the number of married male children
in the household, J is the number of married female children in the household and P(￿;￿) is
the permutation operator. For example, a household with one married female child and two
married male children has two potential child couple combinations. One with three female
children and two male children (or vice versa) has six potential combinations.
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Figure 17a: Anhui LL 1990-1982 total gains by husband's age gap
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